R+A-47

A

CONFIDENTIAL

OSS
CONFIDENTIAL
1945

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

British Empire Section

Special Memorandum No.24

097.3
Z109c
No.47

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE DIVISION
FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN
REF

AMERICA AND INDIA'S WAR MORALE

DECLASSIFIED: Authority letter of
1-21-72 from E.H. Procknow, State Dept.
By Odell R. Barry Date 12/18/72

January 7, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL
British Empire Section
Special Memorandum No. 24
January 7, 1941

SUMMARY

India's war morale is important, but is slack and needs stimulus. This stimulus might be supplied by the United States. It might consist of some or all of the following: military aid; aid in solving India's political problem; propaganda by radio, moving pictures, printed matter, speakers in India. In an appendix are some ideas on radio broadcasting to India.

CONTENTS

Need of Stimulus to India's War Morale

How America might supply the Stimulus

- Military Aid
- Aid in Solving the Political Problem
- Radio
- Moving Pictures
- Newspaper and Magazine Articles
- Translation of American Books
- Speakers

Appendix: Some Ideas on Radio Broadcasting to India

CONFIDENTIAL

British Empire Section
Special Memorandum No.24

AMERICA AND INDIA'S WAR MORALE

Need of Stimulus to India's War Morale

Although the Allied cause requires that India should now cooperate more vigorously in the war than heretofore, indications are that she is not being won to support the British cause. Rather she is still concentrating on her own problems instead of the war. Even the decision of the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress at the end of December to give assistance to the war is phrased to show that this assistance is to defeat the Japanese aggression and is proffered in spite of the British. There is a distinct undertone that this time, as when a somewhat similar action was taken in 1940, the Congress may again return to an unmitigated neutrality if the British fail to meet the Congress' aspirations.

How America Might Supply the Stimulus

In the circumstances it may well be that the United States could aid in allaying present Indian discontent, if Britain and India, our allies, agree. The United States is trusted by India as both democratic and honest, and is admired

for its ideals and achievements. President Roosevelt is a hero in India today, being more highly esteemed than any other foreigner. These advantages might well be capitalized to help strengthen India's will to war.

The following means might tend to that end.

1. Military Aid. America might send India officers for some of her military units; she might even dispatch an entire American division (see in British Empire Section Special Memorandum No. 20).

2. Aid in Solving the Political Problem. America might help smooth out the quarrel between India and Britain. This quarrel chiefly concerns the granting to India of "Dominion Status," which the Chamberlain and Churchill governments have both promised for after the war, although without setting any more definite date for fulfillment of the promise. The basic trouble is that Indians do not believe that Mr. Churchill and the British mean to fulfill the promise at any time. Important British statesmen, such as Sir Stanley Reed speaking before the Royal Empire Society on December 10th, recognize this fact and the bar it constitutes to settling relations between Britain and India.

America might assist here provided Mr. Churchill will

assure President Roosevelt of his and the British government's sincerity. Having received this assurance Mr. Roosevelt might then take such steps as the following:

(a) Instruct Mr. Bullitt, who will soon be in India, to meet the leaders of various Indian parties, present to them the American view of the war and stress the ideals which President Roosevelt himself has advanced in his public speeches. He should urge their full cooperation to defeat the Axis powers and nullify the Axis aim of world domination. At the same time he could hold out to them the prospect of greater freedom for India and all men everywhere with the stronger establishment of democratic principles that must follow an Allied victory. When the question arises of the sincerity of British promises, Mr. Bullitt can assure these Indian leaders that Mr. Roosevelt is convinced that Mr. Churchill is sincere, and America is confident that the British will keep their word. Mr. Bullitt might at the same time listen attentively, but without expressing agreement or dissent, to the statements of their position which Indian leaders will be anxious to make to him. It is possible that, as they talk, he may be able to detect points on which they might be willing to compromise so that a general Indian agreement might be reached on the character of the constitution which will have to be framed.

(b) Himself deliver a speech on the threat which Japan

and Germany offer to the Orient, and the hope which an Allied victory promises.

3. Radio. America could put on a radio broadcast program to India of considerable extent. Plans are already being made by the propaganda division of the C.O.I. with the cooperation of Mr. Henry Field's office, but these might be accelerated. The campaign might start on a small scale, with possibly only one broadcast daily to India, but arrangements could be made as rapidly as possible to increase that to two broadcasts daily, morning and evening, in the major languages of India. A memorandum on the character of the American material that might be effective in India has already been supplied by the British Empire Section to Mr. Field and Mr. Potter, and notes from it are attached to this present memorandum in the form of an Appendix.

4. Moving Pictures. These are very popular in India amoung the middle classes, perhaps even more popular than the radio. Educational pictures about America such as The River or the film prepared by the Agricultural Department on the soil erosion and tenant farmer problems of the South would be very valuable in India as showing our frank recognition of evils and

our effort to win popular support in attacking them. A picture on the TVA, if one were made, might be equally stirring to the imagination of India. Anti-Nazi propaganda films could also be used.

5. Newspaper and Magazine Articles interpreting America to India and stressing democratic ways of life could be prepared and sent out. Other articles written in America but dealing with Indian matters might also be sent there. They would all be likely to get space in Indian newspapers and weekly and monthly periodicals. The number of articles need not be large, but they should be sent to India regularly.

6. Translations of American Books. A few selected books and pamphlets might be put into the most important Indian vernaculars.

7. Speakers. These might be of two sorts: (1) a very few Americans sent to India; (2) Americans and Indians already in India who could present the American point of view about the war.

It cannot be guaranteed that American effort would turn India's mind away from her present preoccupation with lesser matters and direct it to the single purpose of winning the war. But no other way of trying to influence her seems nearly so likely

to be successful. She can make a tremendous effort, which might well be the decisive element in the war in southeast Asia. But inner disorder might vitiate her war effort and be disastrous for the Allies.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX: Ideas on Radio Broadcasting to India

1. Aims:

   a. To stimulate India's will to war.

   b. To further good relations between India and the United States.

      (Caution: America must never appear to be pleading Britain's cause.)

2. Form: Each broadcast could contain a certain amount of news coupled with a unified talk on some topic or group of more or less related topics

3. Ideas to be implanted:

   America is strong and powerful and means to defeat the Axis.

   Democracy holds hope for the world; Naziism holds despair.

   Naziism is fundamentally abhorrent to Indian thought, both Hindu and Muslim.

   India will gain political, economic, and social advance by supporting the democracies.

4. Subject Matter (besides news):

   President Roosevelt's speeches.

   American activities and opinions connected with the war.

   American undertakings of large social import, such as:

Social Security legislation and activities.

Assistance to farmers in securing credit, planning and marketing crops, etc.

Wagner Act and NLRB

TVA; Grand Coulee Dam

President Roosevelt's personality and daily life.

Mrs. Roosevelt's personality and activities.

News stories of small importance by sympathetic to Indian ideals.

5. Treatment:

Where possible some link with India should be included in the broadcast. There might be a reference to an Indian holiday or to some event in India's past or to some current news item from India. References to Indian literature are very effective, and the quotation of any well-known proverb is a knockout (on such points Indian reaction is different from American).

6. Audience types: Potential audiences are:

a. Educated middle classes, with high school or college background, all speaking English. These can be reached by broadcasts in English and the local vernacular.

b. Lower middle classes, literate in their native vernacular but incapable of following a broadcast in English. Some of these own sets, but others would be dependent upon

public or semi-public sets in bazaars.

c. Illiterate lower classes, some urban but most of them rural. None of these own sets but they might be reached through public bazaar sets.

The first of these classes is by far the most important, but the others are worth attention.

7. Reaching the Audiences:

a. Group (a) above can be reached by broadcasts in English.

b. All groups can be reached by vernaculars.

(1). At present Burmese (which for practical purposes here may be included with Indian tongues), Bengali, and Hindustani are the most important. The Japanese are broadcasting to Burma and Bengal and their propaganda should be met.

(2). Other vernaculars of importance are: Tamil, Marathi, Gujarati, Punjabi, Telugu.

(3). Of less importance are Kanarese, Malayalam, Sindhi, and Pashtu. Pashtu may suddenly become important.

DEC 21

OSS (R&A) 47 0,13

Morale, India 6,19

" " "

Propaganda in by U.S. 7,14

" "

" "

Broadcasts to India 6.10.2

" " "